THE HISTORICAL HORIZONS OF INTERNAL COLONIALISM

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_Nayrapacha means ancient times. But not in the sense of a past that is dead, incapable of renovation. It implies that this world can be changed, a past that can also be the future._

_-Carlos Mamani (1)_

In January of 1974, under one of Bolivia’s incessant dictatorships, the army opened fire on a crowd of Quechua Indians from the region of Tolata and Epizaña near Cochabamba, killing at least 13. (2) The Indians had staged a peaceful roadblock along the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway to protest low prices for agricultural products. The massacre unleashed long-repressed ethnic conflicts, which had their origin in efforts to inculcate a "citizen's consciousness” among Indian peoples over the previous hundred years. Paradoxically, this was a region where a market economy and private property had predominated for centuries, where mestizo or culturally mixed Quechua peasants had been in the forefront of the government-sponsored peasant unions formed to help carry out land reform following the 1952 nationalist revolution. (3)

The residents of Tolata were stunned by the unilateral rupture of their "pact of citizenship" with the state. In the Aymara-speaking region 250 miles away, where ethnic consciousness has been high since the eighteenth century, the massacre was considered an intolerable affront. In the very same communities that spawned the 1780 rebellion led by Tupaq Katari, people invoked Katari’s name to challenge the notion that native people should accept a "citizen" identity-bestowed by liberal reformers beginning in 1874, but only fully applied after 1952 - that only confirmed Indians' second-class status. Promoting instead an anti-colonial identity, these "Kataristas" denounced the "political serfdom" to which Andean peoples had been subjected through public schools, universal suffrage, and the undermining of community life.

The new generation of leaders that emerged developed innovative ways of organizing. They founded cultural centers (such as the Centro Mink’a) and urban movements (like the Julian Apaza University Movement), as well as political organizations (Tupaq Katari Revolutionary Movement and Tupaq Katari Indian Movement). The participation of Aymaras with high-school or college degrees gave these organizations a new and particular character.

The Kataristas focused much of their anger on the Peasant-Military Pact, which the de facto regime of Gen. René Barrientos (1964-1969) used to turn peasant unions against the radical and autonomous miners unions. By denouncing the "pact," the Kataristas helped unveil the overt U.S. manipulation of Bolivian politics and thus gained support from the worker and student movements. They worked from within the official unions, and by 1977 had succeeded in transforming these into a political arena for challenging a broad array of state policies.

Such efforts paid off in early 1978, before the overthrow of the Banzer dictatorship. At a semi-clandestine congress of the pro-government National Confederation of Peasant Workers, delegates from all nine of Bolivia's regions added Tupaq Katari to the group's name, thus implicitly recognizing an unprecedented situation. For the first time since the 1952 revolution, an Indian ideology and organization were to lead the struggles of the country's Indian and non-Indian peasants.
The following year, during a period of transition to a civilian regime, the Katarista movement joined forces with Marxist peasant groups to form the United Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), aligned with the Bolivian Workers Central (COB). This newfound unity was put to the test in November and December of that year, when tens of thousands of peasants staged a protest campaign that paralyzed major highways throughout the country. Their success heightened the Katarista movement's prestige, allowing it to remain at the head of the CSUTCB for nearly a decade.

The Kataristas proposed that indigenous identity become the core of a new society. They drew on Aymara oral traditions and the writings of Indian intellectuals such as Fausto Reynaga, as well as the memory of the anti-colonial rebellions and the anti-liberal struggles of the nineteenth century, to recreate this vision. Today's experience of racial and cultural discrimination catalyzed these aspects of collective memory, and led to a true "reinvention" of Andean history. This renewal of people's sense of the past allowed them to envision new political and social potential for the future.

In the process, the long-term memory of eighteenth-century anti-colonial struggles acquired new significance. Just before his execution, Tupaq Katari had prophesized: "I die today, but I will rise again, and I will be millions..." The Kataristas traced the crisis in the Andean world to the European invasion of 1532. Yet they recognized the structural impact of the 1952 revolution, and viewed peasant unions as the most important arena for building a multi-ethnic society based on "unity in diversity." And to the ancient ethical principles of the Inca empire -- "Thou shalt not be a thief, a traitor or a laggard" - they added one more: "Thou shalt not be servile."

The 1.5 million Amara people who today live in Bolivia did not consider themselves a "people" until the end of the eighteenth century. (4) During the pre-Hispanic and early colonial periods, the Andean region was a mosaic of diverse ethnicities, languages and societies, in which "Aymara" was little more than the lingua franca among a multitude of ethnic federations in an enormous territory centred on the "aquatic axis" of lakes Titicaca and Poopó. Ironically, it was the colonial experience which imposed a certain unity by grouping distinct indigenous cultures into the homogenizing category of Indians, a colonized people. (5)

Before Inca times, interlocking kinship groupings (the ayllu orjatha) were dispersed in several ecological tiers along the highlands, valleys and lowlands on both sides of the Andes. Despite the distances involved, these achieved an ecological complementarity, not by trade, but by intra and inter-ethnic relations of redistribution and reciprocity, which did not seem to require the presence of a strong central state. Andean society has been compared to a Chinese box toy: ayllus were linked on different levels by ritual and symbolic relations which bestowed a high degree of legitimacy on the increasingly vertical differentiation among them. (6) Tawantinsuyu, as the Incas called their empire, made use of all these mechanisms to reorganize the economy and ideology of the Andean world in order to seduce the disperse ethnic groups into the state or to conquer them. But it did so based on the metaphor of blood relationships, and thus codified a system of domination in which tolerance for ethnic diversity was not violated. (7)

This does not mean that the Andean world was free of conflict; in fact, it was rife with inter-ethnic rivalries and internecine power struggles. At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards, Tawantinsuyu was embroiled in a particularly bitter war of succession between two brothers, Waskar and Atawallpa.* The conquistadors easily exploited these divisions, initiating a cycle of violent domination best expressed by the Andean concept of pachakuti - a Quechua and Aymara word meaning the disruption of the universe. (8)
The looting of temples, the "death of the gods," and the brutal aggression against all aspects of indigenous society wrought more than the destruction of a symbolic order and a political system. It was open genocide. The new gods brought with them plagues such as the Andean people had never seen. Disease, warfare, and the massacre of civilians caused the population of seven or eight million to plummet by two-thirds from 1530 to 1560. By 1590, the population had decreased by another 40%. (9)

Until well into the sixteenth century, the Spaniards were confronted with two tenacious rebellions: the "Takiy unquy," which began in Huamanga (in present-day Peru) and spread south toward La Paz and Chuquisaca; and the defiant Inca state of Vilcabamba, near Cuzco. The Takiy unquy (a Quechua expression which literally means "the dance of disease") was something of a collective religious phenomenon, a radical reaction against the imposition of Christianity and a call for a return to the pre-Inca cult of wak'as, or ancestor worship.

The Vilcabamba rebellion was more explicitly political, launched in 1536 by Manqu Inka, who sought to drive out the Spanish or, failing that, to negotiate the recognition of a parallel Inca state. After a long siege of the ancient Inca capital Cuzco and a failed attempt to take it back from the Spaniards, the rebels withdrew to the subtropical region of Vilcabamba, where they held out for more than three decades in a kind of "liberated zone" (although they were not free from European disease). The rebellion collapsed after its leader Tupaq Amaru I, successor of Wayna Qhapaq Inka, was beheaded in Cuzco in 1572. His death recalled the murder of the emperor Atawallpa 40 years earlier and seemed to confirm the cosmic rupture of the Inca world." (10)

Both of these efforts demonstrated the peculiar character of native resistance, which intimately linked the political and religious dimensions by joining the struggle for liberation to the defense of a symbolic order, a cultural world-view expressed in ancient rituals and customs. The defeat of both movements cemented the schism between Indian and Spaniard, and contributed to the mythical view that the conquistadors were not quite human, that they were malignant beings (lik 'ichiriin Quechua, kharisiriin Aymara) sent to extract the untu, the lifeblood of the people. Colonial rule was firmly in place by the end of the sixteenth century, under the administration of Viceroy Francisco Toledo. Ecologically disperse communities were relocated into nucleated settlements, made to pay tribute in silver and in labor, and forced to accept Christianity, the "colonization of the soul." (11)

During the seventeenth century, a series of laws, known as the Leyes de Indias, were enacted to "protect" the indigenous population. Colonial law partitioned the Andean world into dual entities, the "Republic of Spaniards" and the "Republic of Indians," each with its own separate courts, laws and rights.' (12) From the point of view of the colonial state, the division was a pragmatic measure to prevent the extermination of the labour force and restrain the ambitions of the colonizers. But from the perspective of the indigenous population, the idea of "two republics," which implied some kind of mutual recognition between colonizers and colonized, came to embody complex Andean territorial concepts, including not only physical space but legal or political domain-the political space for self-government.

If the Conquest itself could not be reversed, at least the vanquished could use the Leyes de Indias to conserve what remained of their territories and traditional authorities. These "rights" became ingrained in the Aymara collective memory as a sort of "social pact" between the colonizers and the colonized. In exchange, Indians would obey the forced labour edicts (mit'a), pay tribute, and even incorporate foreign
gods into their pantheon of deities.

Indian land rights were formalized through land titles (settlement and sale agreements) granted by the colonial administration to Indian authorities. Over time, these titles (nayra titulu or ch'ullpa titulu), even though they fell within the framework of Spanish legal concepts, encapsulated and recreated the memory of ethnic identity. (13) Both the sacred meaning of space as the site of ancestor shrines and tombs, as well as traditional territorial organization in discontinuous ecological zones, managed to filter through. After independence, colonial land titles and the notion of legal rights embodied in the Leyes de Indias were used to defend indigenous territories against the voracity of large landowners. These two dimensions of the colonial experience remain part of indigenous identity today. (14)

The Bourbon reforms introduced in Spain in the eighteenth century, like most reforms generated in the metropolis, were adopted selectively by colonial societies to enable local elites to respond to new economic and political demands while preserving the colonial order. After passing through the colonial prism, the results were often the opposite of the reforms' original intent. Thus, what in Spain were policies inspired by the humanism of the Enlightenment became in the Americas new and "enlightened" ways to deny the humanity of Native Americans. Measures that in Spain led to the modernization of the state and the creation of a national laissez-faire economy were unable in the colonies to clear away restrictions on commercial activity or control the compulsory sale of imported goods to commoners, a lucrative practice in the hands of local officials.

Much has been written about the 1780 Indian rebellion led by José Gabriel Tupaq Amaru and his successors; less is known about the Chayanta and Sikasika revolts which occurred at the same time, the latter led by Julian Apasa Tupaq Katari. (15) For more than half a century, colonial tax laws had provoked a groundswell of protest among farmers, Indian labourers, merchants and artisans, and even landowners and parish priests. In mid-1780, an apparently spontaneous revolt broke out in Macha, in the province of Chayanta, to free an Indian cacique (authority), Tomis Katari, jailed after a dispute with local mestizo authorities who had tried to usurp his position. Then in November 1780, José Gabriel Tupaq Amaru led a well-organized rebellion in Tungasuca, near Cuzco. Julian Apasa Tupaq Katari, an Indian commoner from Sullkawi (Sikasika), rose up and laid seige to La Paz from March to October 1781, during which one fourth of the city's population died. After the defeat in April 1781 of Tupaq Amaru in Cuzco, the rebellion shifted to Azingaro, where his relatives Andrés and Diego Cristobal led the struggle. Andrés successfully laid siege to Sorata in August of that year, but by November he and Diego Cristobal were forced to surrender to the Spanish authorities. The rebellion was crushed by the beginning of 1782.

Most scholars ascribe the rebellion's failure to an inherent tension between the "national" integrationist tendency of Tupaq Amaru and the ethnic separatist leanings of Tupaq Katari, which led to a different set of alliances with mestizos and Creoles. (16) But this Western conceptual framework, which some apply to today's Katarista movement as well, falls short. Diverse and often conflicting world-views were at work within the rebel movement. The leaders-most of them educated people, capable of translating indigenous concepts into Spanish terminology-had a vision of politics that derived from the colonial world. Their use of words, paper and "collective negotiation," and their belief that victory bestows rights, marked a radical departure from the ways of most native people. Most Indians viewed politics within a framework of ritual and symbolic codes, based on the ancient capacity for tolerance and unity among the diverse homologous cultures and societies of the Andean world.

The colonial notion of "two republics," whereby colonizers and colonized could coexist, was also an element in the rebellion. But the Bourbonic reforms had eroded this idea to such a degree that
coexistence among Indians, cholos (acculturated Indians), mestizos and Creoles only seemed possible through the restoration of the world balance (pacha) by means of an upheaval (kuti) in which the ancient sovereigns would return to the peak of the segmented social pyramid, an outcome that Spaniards and Creoles, as well as the majority of mestizos and cholos, obviously would not tolerate. The rebel leadership called for a pachakuti, but was also prepared to accept a minimum programme to assure coexistence: respect for the law within the "two republic" code.

For the farmers, labourers, and Indian women who formed the rank and file of the rebellion, and who experienced daily exploitation at the hands of the colonial rulers, coexistence with the colonial world meant continued abuse. For these groups, only the expulsion of the invaders could restore equilibrium to the indigenous world. Foreigners were again viewed as iiakaq, kharisiri, lik'ichiri.(17) These two poles-one seeking coexistence, the other expulsion-were present in all the regional factions of the rebellion, and it continually oscillated between them. This may help explain some of its radical tactics.

The restoration of the cosmic order - what a linear perception of time condemns as "turning back the clock of history" - is expressed by the Andean concept of nayrapacha: a past capable of redeeming the future, of turning the tables. Isn't this the aspiration of indigenous movements the world over which continue to affirm their ancestral culture in the midst of modern society?

In 1780, the pre-Columbian world was not restored. The defeat of the rebellion was played out like a reenactment of the Conquest, and it left a bitter legacy. The terror of the siege of La Paz, ingrained in the memory of the conquerors, became the foundation for future relations between the Andean countries (which became independent a generation later) and the dominated Indian population. Set against the Europe of the Enlightenment, indigenous culture was portrayed as "barbarian," "heretic," "savage"-and more recently in liberal-Marxist thought, as "pre-capitalist." All these characterizations presumed "a progression, a transformation, whether from paganism to Christianity, or from barbarism to civilization." (18)

Violence also became ingrained in indigenous memory. The punishment for the leaders of the rebellion was particularly grisly: they were quartered, decapitated or burned alive. Pieces of their bodies were scattered throughout the region that had rebelled; their ashes were thrown into the rivers (like the ashes of wak'as ancestor shrines during the extirpation of idolatries). In these ceremonies, the Spaniards and Creoles-as well as many mestizos and acculturated Indians, out of fear or by conviction-reaffirmed the right of conquest as the foundation of their society. For the Indians, this drove home vividly the message of their defeat, but only as one of the pendulous swings of the cyclical movement of history. The quartered Indian body would again be made whole, through the pachakuti - the time of renovation/revolution.

Even the most "enlightened" Spaniards carried out these violent acts as a "civilizing mission," a holy war against the infidels, or an exorcism of the devil - and sometimes all three at once. One of the most rabidly anti-Indian pronouncements in the wake of the defeat of Amaru and Katari in 1782 is attributed to a prosperous resident of La Paz: "...the Indian needs a constant lash to keep him from laziness, and he should not acquire wealth for this will only encourage his drunkenness and propensity to rebel. From now on, [Indians] should pay double tribute to the Crown. The King should abolish Indian communities and sell their lands to Spaniards, [he should] turn the Indians over to the Holy Office of the Inquisition, since they are more malicious than us, and burn the Leyes de Indias..." (19)

Except for the Inquisition-which would be replaced by more enlightened ways of colonizing native souls, such as schools and barracks-these recommendations were scrupulously applied in the rebellious
The territories by the Creole elite that took over the reins of government following independence between 1810 and 1825. The new Andean republics emerged branded by their conflictive history, which ratified the irreconcilable division into two worlds, but without the legal safeguards of the colonial "pact." (20) The Leyes de Indias were replaced by the massacre of Indians (and of workers) as the principal way in which the Creole and mestizo elite practised "politics" whenever that elite was obliged to emerge from its gilded halls to normalize its relations with the dominated Indian and cholo world. Slaughter was and continues to be employed preventively, rather than punitively, to ensure "stability." (21)

Another structural legacy of the 1780-1782 rebellion and repression was the notion that reforms too were to be undertaken only as preventive measures, to calm the real or imagined fury of the underclass. The two major efforts at liberal reform-in 1874 and following the 1952 revolution-invariably turned into ways to obscure and preserve the old colonial structures, due to the insecurity and double morality of the reformers.

Under the "citizenship" granted to Indians in the 1874 liberal legislation, "equality before the law" applied only to individuals. The law denied protection to indigenous communities, whose only "right" was the right to sell their lands. The 1953 agrarian reform broadened the meaning of individual to mean property-owner, by parceling out large holdings and communal lands to peasant families. In both frameworks, indigenous culture was considered an obstacle to social progress. Indians would gain human rights only after they had given up their culture and assumed a Western identity as educated, mestizo producers, property-owners and consumers. Extremes of violence against the "pre-Western" Indian world could thus be tolerated. (22)

By 1974, when the modern Katarista movement emerged, nearly two centuries had passed since the Amaru-Katari rebellion. More than two decades had gone by since the populist and nationalist revolution of 1952. In the interim, indigenous movements tended to oscillate between two widely disparate goals, successively or simultaneously expressed in legal struggle and armed struggle: either Bolivian society must accept Indian autonomy and return to the colonial pact of the "two republics"; or the Creole elites must live up to the universal humanist spirit of the liberal reforms, granting full and equal rights to all citizens, without racial, ethnic or religious discrimination.

The Kataristas faced a similar situation during their decade at the head of the national peasant federation (CSUTCB). By accepting the union as the main forum for peasant organizing, they had to confront the unpleasant legacy of government tutelage and, more broadly, that of the entire citizen model. They also had to deny, in practice, the cultural and organizational pluralism of existing native societies. Even with Kataristas at the head, the CSUTCB became increasingly isolated from Indian organizations in the Amazon and the regional ethnic authorities in northern Potosi, western Oruro, and even the highlands and valleys around La Paz and Chuquisaca. In these regions the union's presence was somewhat artificial, limited by the "civilizing" and clientelistic practices that were inherited from post-revolutionary mestizo unionism. (23)

Much of the blame for this isolation can be attributed to pressure from the Left, which wielded great influence within the unions. Katarista initiatives to restructure the CSUTCB taking ethnic diversity into account were continually blocked. The Left apparently found it difficult to accept policies formulated by Indians, and moreover, feared that recognizing traditional ethnic authorities would reduce the Left's capacity to influence the political activity of the movement. Viewing themselves as the only ones capable of "politics," and unable to tolerate Indians' aspiration to lead themselves, leftists consistently sought to manipulate or divide the peasant federation.
The conflict between the Left and the Kataristas came to a head between 1985 and 1988, in the midst of the government's free-market "shock treatment," which broke the back of the labor movement and decimated the rural economy. [See NACLA's Report on the Americas, Vol. XXV, No. 1.] The combination of internal strife and the government's offensive decimated the CSUTCB. The Kataristas lost influence, while the ethnic consciousness they championed became little more than a banner anyone could hang.

In fact, the Left itself came to adopt a pro-Indian discourse as a way to deal with its own crisis. Grafted on to the traditional liberal/revolutionary language of Marxism and the populist heritage of the Bolivian revolution, the Left's new indigenismo still excludes Indians. Elite leftist politicians continue to believe they are the proper owners of the political arena. Some even envision themselves at the top of a pluri-national, pluri-ethnic future state, analogous to the position occupied by the King of Spain in the eighteenth Century. (24)

Today, as in the past, indigenous movements demand a radical restructuring of society. Indian autonomy (territorial, social, cultural, linguistic and political) is the starting point for building a new egalitarian, multi-ethnic nation. These ideas were present in the struggles of Manqu Inka in 1536 and both Amaru and Katari in 1780. But, as in the past, indigenous struggles today clash head on with tenacious colonial structures that condemn Indians to a fate of punishment and mutilation.

History teaches us that this dialectic gives rise to separatist sentiment. If co-existence is impossible, it is only logical that indigenous groups acquire an identity based on exclusion, and adopt a radical posture calling for the expulsion of the invaders and the recuperation of sovereignty lost in 1532. At the other end of the spectrum, the question of citizenship and participation in "Bolivian" society is a point of much debate. The evident crisis in the paradigms of "progress" and "development" has opened up the discussion of the potential of an Indian vision for the future.

What sort of social and political organization would make an egalitarian multi-ethnic society possible? What sort of state could give institutional expression to such a society, and ensure equality and mutual respect? The notion of a multi-ethnic state raises a question as old as the Inca: In a complex, multi-ethnic "nation" composed of diverse societies, who should constitute the umbrella authority that would link its many segments? In Bolivia, where Indians make up 60% of the population, and where the majority of cholos and mestizos suffer similar effects of alienation, these issues touch the lives of millions. The fact that they can be freely debated is a hopeful sign that the future of Bolivia is still open.

In October 1990, 800 Indians from the Amazon - Moxefios, Yuracarés, Chimanes and Guaranfes - walked 330 miles from the northern Amazonian city of Trinidad to La Paz, in a month-long "March for Land and Dignity." When the marchers reached the mountain pass that separates the highlands from the Amazonian plains, thousands of Aymaras, Quechuas, and Urus from all over Bolivia, together with many non-Indians from the capital, turned out spontaneously to welcome our brothers and sisters. The march turned into a multi-ethnic festival that coat-and-tie Bolivia could not quell. At that moment, the clear calm sky suddenly clouded over and unleashed a downpour. The thunder and rain lasted only a few minutes, then the sun again shone. (Few failed to note that the very same thing had occurred during the executions of both Tupaq Amaru I and Tupaq Amaru II. (25)

From the depths of time and space, the fusion of the fragmented Indian body suddenly seemed possible - like a pachakuti, the cosmic rupture that strikes like lightning in the clear blue sky of linear history. But the blindness of the official nation - for which reform means simply the jockeying for power
among political parties - raises a darker spectre. Perhaps the time of war is not far off. Pachakuti means both catastrophe and renovation. Which of the two will prevail is a question still unanswered.

**References:**


3. See, for example, Brooke Larson, Colonialism and Agrarian transformation in Bolivia: Cochabamba 1550-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) and Gustavo Rodriguez and Humberto Solares, Sociedad oligarquica, chicha y cultura popular (Cochabamba: Editorial Serrano, 1990). See also Silvia Rivera, "Oppressed But Not Defeated"

4. Of Bolivia's seven million people, at least 1.5 million are Aymara and 2.5 million are Quechua - a clear Indian majority. Aymara is spoken by 48% of the residents of La Paz.


7. See J. Szemenski, La utopia tupamarista (Lima: Pontifica Universidad Catolica del Peru, 1983); Bouysse, La identidad aymara, p.304, who views the Inca as "colonizers" vis-a-vis the Aymara, just as the Aymara "colonized" the Uru.

8. Pacha is "time-space," and kuti is "turn" or "revolution." As with many Andean concepts, pachakuti can take on different shades of meaning, in this case either "catastrophe" or "renovation."


10. Nathan Wachtel, Los vencidos, pp. 269-291; and Szeminski, La utopia tupamarista, pp. 125-126. Szeminski maintains the pachakuti corresponded to "sometime between the outbreak of the civil war between Ataw Wallpa Inkas and Waskhar Inka and the beheading of Thupa Amaro Inka in 1572." He
notes, moreover, that the Spanish Viceroy Toledo "was called Pacha-Kuti by the Indians."

11. This phrase is taken from Fernando Mires, La colonizacion de las almas: Mision y conquista en hispanoamerica (San Jose: Departamento Eucumenico de Investigaciones, 1987). In a broad sense, the term can be used to describe not only religious colonization, but many other mechanisms (such as education, or the notion of "civilization") used by the dominant elites to undermine Indian identity and impose a Western world-view.


13. These are Aymara terms. Nayra means ancient, in the past, but also eye, or vision. Ch'ullpa means pre-historic or pre-Inca. See Silvia Rivera, "El mallku y la sociedad colonial en el siglo XVII," Avances, no. 1 (1978). The role of these settlement and sale agreements in twentieth-century Indian resistance has also been addressed in Taller de Historia Oral Andina, El indio Santos Marka T'ula, cacique principal de los ayllus de Qallapay apoderado general de las comunidades originarias la republica (La Paz: Ediciones del Taller de de Historia Oral Andina, 1988); and Rivera et al., "Pedimos la revision de limites: un episodio de incomunicacion de castas en 1918-1921," paper presented at the Simposio sobre reproduccion y transformacion de las sociedades andinas (Quito: Social Science Research Council, July 1986).


15. See especially Alberto Flores Galindo, Tupac Amaru 11.1780 (Lima: Retablo de Papel, 1976). The work of Polish historian Jan Szeminski is one of the best efforts at reconstructing the perspective of the rebels. See also Stem (ed.), Resistance, Rebellion and Consciousness; Scarlett O'Phelan, Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales. Peru y Bolivia 1700-1783 (Cuzco: Centro Bartolome de las Casas, 1988).


17. This idea is evident in many Aymara myths, which describe the reconciliation of the irreconcilable. See Jan Szeminski, "Why Kill the Spaniard? New Perspectives on Andean Insurrectionary Ideology in the 18th Century," in Stem (ed.), Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness.

18. Szeminski, La utopia tuparamarista, p. 80. This view is shared by many Marxists, which helps explain the rift between leftist organizations and indigenous movements.

19. Quoted in ibid, p. 41.
20. Included in this legacy are the mestizos and cholos, whose ambiguous position as colonizers/colonized formed a conflictive bond between the two segregated worlds, creating new alliances for each.

21. Similarities to the practice and ideology of "low-intensity warfare" are more than coincidental. With respect to the theme of massacre, emerging Aymara historiography has made important contributions. See Carlos Mamani, "Historia y prehistoria," and Roberto Choque, Sublevacion y masacre de Jestids de Machaqa (La Paz: Chitakolla, 1986).

22. Demands regarding education showed this ambiguity. See, for example, Carlos Mamani, ibid; Taller de Historia Oral Andina, La escuela indigena: Colonizacion o cuidadania? (La Paz: Aruwiyiri, 1991); and Silvia Rivera et al. Cuidadania soberania? Cuatro ensayos sobre el colonialismo interno de Bolivia (La Paz: Aruwiyiri, forthcoming).


24. See, for example, Movimiento Bolivia Libre, Repensar el pais (La Paz: s.p.i., 1987) or Xavier Albo, Par una Bolivia diferente. Aportes para un proyecto historico popular (La Paz: Centro de Investigacion y Promocion Campesina, 1991)